In 206 BCE, in the fields of south-eastern Spain, near the present-day town of Alcalá del Río, located 14 km north of Seville, the most brilliantly maneuverable battle of the Second Punic War took place.
This battle may even surpass in its artistry the famous Battle of Cannae from 216 BCE, during which Hannibal defeated Roman forces almost twice as large as his army. Today’s Spanish Alcalá del Río is ancient Ilipa. While there is probably no ancient history enthusiast who has not heard about Cannae, the Battle of Ilipa, because we are talking about it, remains somewhat unnoticed in the annals of history. It’s a pity, because it is one of the most interesting and important battles of the Second Punic War. It would not be an exaggeration to say that it was on Spanish soil near Ilipa that the fate of the Second Punic War was largely decided. The Battle of Ilipa took place in the final phase of the conflict, so in order to fully understand its impact on the final tipping of the scales of victory in the entire war to Rome’s side, it is necessary to show the genesis of it. Here’s how it happened and what happened then.
Briefly about the causes of the outbreak of the Second Punic War
The Second Punic War took place in the years 218 – 201 BCE between Carthage and the Roman Republic. Due to the enormous material, financial and human resources involved in waging this war by each of the parties involved in it and the geographical diversity of places where this conflict took place (i.e. the Apennine Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, Sicily, Sardinia, the Balkan Peninsula and Africa Northern) some historians have been tempted to compare the Second Punic War to the world war of ancient times1. The most important figure of the Second Punic War was Hannibal, a Carthaginian leader from the powerful Barkid family. For this reason, the Second Punic War is also called the Hannibal War.
Hannibal was the eldest of the three sons of Hamilcar Barkas, a Carthaginian leader who, in 237 BCE, together with his son-in-law Hasdrubal the Fair, set out from his native Carthage to the Iberian Peninsula in order to bring Carthaginian influence to this area of the ancient world. In 229 BCE, Hamilcar Barkas died in one of the battles with the indigenous inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula. After his death, the rule over the Carthaginian estates in Spain that he had created was taken over by Hasdrubal the Fair due to Hannibal’s young age at the time of his father’s death. Hasdrubal the Fair continued to expand Carthage’s influence in Spain, but unlike his father-in-law, he did it mainly through diplomacy. Around 228 BCE, he founded the city of New Carthage2 (Latin: Carthago Nova, now Cartagena), which he established as the capital of the Carthaginian rule in Spain3.
It should be mentioned that the expansion of Carthage’s influence among the Iberian tribes did not go unnoticed by the Romans. Rome, concerned about the growth of Carthaginian rule in Spain in 226 BCE, turned to Hasdrubal the Fair with a proposal to conclude a treaty aimed at dividing the influence of both states in this area. This treaty (or – as some historians believe due to the fact that it was never approved by the Senate in their native Carthage – the so-called berit,, i.e. a kind of personal oath of Hasdrubal) prohibited the Carthaginians from crossing in their conquests on the Iberian Peninsula, the Iber River (Latin: Iberus or Hiberus), currently identified with the Ebro River4. At the moment when Hasdrubal the Fair concluded this agreement with the Romans, it was beneficial to the Carthaginians because the area under their authority was still far south of the mentioned river, which de facto became a natural border dividing Spain into spheres of influence. The area of the Iberian Peninsula south of the Iber River was Carthage’s sphere of influence, while north of it it was Rome’s sphere of influence. Moreover, this agreement did not prohibit Carthage from conquests in other parts of Spain, e.g. in its north-west 5.
In 221 BCE, Hasdrubal the Fair was murdered by a servant of one of the Iberian rulers. It was after the murder of Hasdrubal the Fair that Hannibal, the oldest of the three sons of the late Hamilcar Barca, took over the rule over the Iberian possessions of Carthage and the command of the Carthaginian army in Spain. Hannibal continued to expand his influence in Spain mainly through conquest. Soon, the area over which Carthage exercised authority was based on the border river Iber (see Fig. 1)6. The exception was a small city-state called Sagunt.
Interestingly, Sagunt was located south of the Iber River, and therefore in Carthage’s sphere of influence. However, he placed himself under the protection of Rome many years before Hannibal took over in Spain. This circumstance allowed Sagunt to maintain its independence. The exact circumstances, time and reasons under which friendly relations were established between the two countries are unknown. It should also be ruled out that Saguntus and Rome had an official foedus (covenant)7. Despite this, the Saguntines, concerned about the growing Carthaginian influence in the region, sent embassies to Rome with requests for support and help. The matter was further complicated by the fact that in Sagunta itself there were riots between two mutually warring parties, one of which opted for an alliance with Carthage, and the other, on the contrary, for an alliance with Rome. Finally, after Saguntu’s insistence, the Republic decided to send envoys to Hannibal8. Hannibal, who had just returned from one of his military expeditions to the winter lair, found Roman envoys at the turn of 220/219 BCE in New Carthage9. The Roman envoys urged him to stop trying to bring Saguntu under Carthaginian rule and to abide by the treaty concluded in 226 BCE by Hasdrubal the Fair not to cross the Iber River in his further conquests. Hannibal replied to the Roman envoys that he did not intend to stand idly by and watch the harm that the Saguntines were doing to his Iberian allies. After the meeting with the Roman envoys, Hannibal sent envoys to Carthage to ask what steps should be taken towards Saguntu, who – as he informed the authorities in Carthage – was harming Carthage’s allies in Spain. The answer that the authorities in Carthage gave to Hannibal is unknown. Most likely, however, Hannibal received instructions from the metropolis, according to which he was to act towards Saguntu as circumstances required at a given moment. Soon he besieged Sagunt. However, the city surrounded by powerful walls put up fierce resistance to the besieging Carthaginians, which was intensified by the besieged waiting for the arrival of Roman help. However, Roman relief did not come. In the spring of 218 BCE – after eight months of siege – Sagunt was captured. Most of the inhabitants were murdered. Shortly after these events, Rome declared war on Carthage10.
Carthage invades Italy, or briefly about the situation of the parties to the conflict in Italy in the years 218 to 211 BCE
Hannibal realized that the appearance of Roman armies in Africa and Spain was only a matter of time. Therefore, he decided to take the initiative and invade Rome himself on its own territory before it could prepare an invasion of the Carthaginian possessions. Due to the overwhelming advantage of the Romans at sea, Hannibal could not, however, cross to Italy in the fastest way possible at that time, i.e. by sea. The Carthaginian army therefore had to get from Spain to Italy by land, which was not so easy and obvious at that time11.
At the end of May 218 BCE, Hannibal, at the head of a large army, set out from New Carthage and marched towards Italy (see Fig. 1). Reaching Italy by land required crossing the Pyrenees, then the Rhone River, and finally the Alps. Crossing an entire army through mountains, especially ones like the Alps, was quite a feat in ancient times. However, precisely because it was so difficult and risky, Hannibal intended it to surprise the Romans and, thanks to the surprise effect, enable them to be defeated in their own territory before they could prepare an effective defense 12.
To understand why it was so important for Hannibal to defeat Rome on its territory, it must be explained that when the Second Punic War began, the Roman state was not ethnically and linguistically homogeneous. Only a few dozen years earlier – in 264 BCE – Rome completed the conquest of Italy, which was inhabited by many tribes (peoples) differing in language and ethnicity. The most important tribes that were conquered by the Romans include the Latins, who shared a common Latin language with the Romans, but also the ethnically and linguistically different Etruscans living in Etruria in the north-west of Italy, the Samnites living in Samnium in central Italy, the Lucanians and Bruttii in southern Italy, and Greeks living in the coastal colonies of southern Italy, such as Kyme, Locri, Tarentum, Heraclea, and which, before the Roman conquest, formed the area of the so-called Magna Graecia (Latin: Magna Graecia). The Roman state in Italy was therefore a kind of federation, consisting of various Italian communities conquered by Rome, inhabiting the area of the Italian Peninsula, collectively known as Italics. The conquered Italics were bound by alliances with Rome, the terms of which depended on whether they were entered into voluntarily or whether they were forced into them as a result of losing the war. A common feature of the alliances concluded between Rome and the Italics was the necessity for the latter to pay tribute to Rome, as well as the obligation to provide Rome with military assistance and the prohibition of concluding other alliances apart from the alliance concluded with Rome. In this way, the Romans controlled the foreign policy of the conquered Italian tribes and made it difficult for them to communicate with each other, for example in order to disobey him. In return for fulfilling the obligations specified in the alliance, the Italic communities allied with Rome retained their full political and religious independence 13.
Transferring the war to the territory of Italy and defeating the Romans on their territory was therefore intended by Hannibal to be eye-witness evidence for the Italian communities they conquered about the weakness of the Roman hegemon and to make them disobey him, which would result in the collapse of the Italian federation. The collapse of the Italian federation would, in turn, deprive Rome of the financial and military resources necessary to wage the war and thus force it to enter into peace negotiations, which – as Hannibal assumed – would result in the end of the war on terms favorable to Carthage14.
Meanwhile, Rome, as Hannibal predicted, decided to attack the Carthaginian possessions in Spain. Around the same time, when Hannibal and his army set off for Italy, an army set off from Italy towards Spain under the command of Publius Cornelius Scipio (father of the later famous Scipio Africanus) assisted in command by his brother Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio (uncle of the same Scipio Africanus) . Both armies came into contact in Gaul near the mouth of the Rhône River into the Mediterranean Sea. Hannibal decided to avoid a clash with the Roman army heading towards him and escaped up the Rhône. The Carthaginian did not want to waste time and strength in a battle with the Romans in Gaul, but to attack and defeat them in Italy as soon as possible. Although Publius Cornelius Scipio did not manage to arrive in Spain before Hannibal set out for Italy, he did not pursue the Carthaginian leader heading up the Rhône. He gave command of the army to his brother Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio with the order to continue the march towards Spain in order to take action against the Carthaginian troops stationed in the area. He, however, returned with a small unit to Italy with the intention of organizing defense and blocking Hannibal’s path when he crossed the Alps and descended from the mountains in its northern part, called the Po Plain. It can therefore be concluded that the two armies passed each other, obviously as a result of conscious decisions made by their commanders15.
In November 218 BCE, Hannibal’s troops descended from the other side of the Alps to the Po Plain. After Hannibal’s initial lightning-fast and brilliant victories in Italy (the first loss in November 218 BCE on the Ticinus River, the Battle of the Trebia in December 218 BCE, the Battle of Lake Trasimene in 217 BCE and finally the greatest of Hannibal’s victories at Cannae in 216 BCE), Hannibal’s strategy started to bring success. The following year, after the Battle of Cannae, Capua, which was the most important city in the region called Campania and the second largest and most important city in Italy after Rome, declared its obedience to Rome. Capua’s conversion to Hannibal’s side was therefore a major success for the Carthaginian leader. In addition to Capua, several other Campanian cities also fell to Hannibal’s side, which allowed Carthage to gain influence in a large part of Campania, which was the most fertile region of Italy 16 In the same 215 BCE, Hannibal also managed to capture several Greek cities on the southern coast of Italy . As a result of the siege, Petelia was occupied, and after the fall of the latter Constance also surrendered. Crotona was taken by storm. Another port city, Locra, itself went over to the side of the Carthaginian leader17. Hannibal’s successes in Italy prompted him to break the alliance with Rome and choose Syracuse, which was the largest Greek city and the port of Sicily, on the side of Carthage. The breaking of the alliance with Rome by Syracuse caused the war to spread to all of Sicily. In addition to the Greek cities, other Italic communities also crossed over to Carthage’s side, such as the most important Samnite tribes and the Lucan and Brutian tribes. By 214 BCE, most of the Roman allies in southern Italy from the regions of Campania, Apulia, Lucania and Bruttium turned against Rome and became allies of Hannibal. In 212 BCE, the Greek Tarentum, the main port city of southern Italy, joined Hannibal’s side, followed by other Greek cities of southern Italy, such as: Turie, Metapontus, Heraclea. This meant that in 212 BCE the entire coastline of the “sole” of the Italian Peninsula was controlled by a Carthaginian leader18. However, the transfer of Rome’s Italian allies to the side of Carthage turned out to be only a partial success for Hannibal. Carthage’s new allies had no sense of community with Carthage. They provided relatively few recruits to augment Hannibal’s forces, but required constant defense against Roman attempts to recapture their cities and restore Roman influence in their area. Rome, which still had large human resources, despite devastating defeats, fielded new legions, but, mindful of the severe defeats inflicted on it by Hannibal (especially the defeat suffered in the Battle of Cannae), despite its huge numerical advantage, it did not dare to give the Punians another major battle in the field. Instead, he adopted a strategy of a war of attrition. Therefore, as soon as Hannibal moved his army from one subjugated area of Italy to another, the Romans appeared in the area abandoned by his army, threatening the cities that supported Carthage and looking for an opportunity to defeat the smaller Carthaginian troops or their local allies left in these areas. Having much smaller forces than his opponent, Hannibal was unable to ensure the safety of all allied cities threatened at a given moment. Therefore, he moved with his army around southern Italy and lost strength in subsequent small clashes of the war of subjugation that the Romans waged against him. Not sufficiently supported by Italian allies, and without reinforcements from his native Carthage, the Carthaginian commander was unable to sufficiently compensate for the losses suffered in battles and numerous skirmishes to be able to undertake a new, large-scale offensive against Rome. In this way, he gradually lost the initiative that he had when entering Italy, which, despite the painful defeats he suffered, was slowly but systematically taken over by his opponent, Rome 19.
In the summer of 212 BCE, after a siege lasting several months, the Romans captured Greek Syracuse in Sicily. The fall of this largest Sicilian city with a strategic location allowed the Romans to take control of the area of the southern coast of Sicily, thus preventing Carthage from using the island as an intermediate point in sending Hannibal reinforcements from Africa by sea. The next year – 211 BCE – the Romans managed to close the siege of Capua. Despite Hannibal’s attempts to come to the aid of the besieged city, Capua was captured. By losing Capua, Hannibal lost his most important Italian ally, whom he had promised to defend. After the Romans regained Capua, the Carthaginian leader no longer managed to shake the loyalty of any of his Roman allies. And although the war would last for many years, and Hannibal would repeatedly take its toll on the Romans, both of these events marked the end of Carthage’s successes in Italy20.
The impasse could only be reversed if the Carthaginian leader received significant military reinforcements. Only by increasing the forces with which Hannibal arrived in Italy in 218 BCE, which were systematically exhausted in the course of hostilities, could he have regained the initiative and taken large-scale military actions that would have persuaded Rome to conclude peace on terms favorable to Carthage. 21. Hannibal could receive reinforcements from two directions: by sea from Africa or by land from Spain. However, while until the fall of Syracuse, providing Hannibal with supplies directly from Carthage, although difficult due to the superiority of the Roman fleet over the Carthaginian fleet, was nevertheless possible22, after their capture it was possible to deliver supplies from Africa to Italy by road the sea was basically cut off. In the current situation, the Carthaginian possessions in Spain, where it would be easiest to recruit, equip and dispatch the reinforcements expected by Hannibal, became particularly important, especially since in the same year 211 BCE, events took place in this theater of war that allowed Hannibal to hope that help would come from this very place. direction.
Rome invades Spain, or briefly about the situation of the parties to the conflict in Spain in the years 218 to 211 BCE
Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio arrived with a fleet in Spain in the late summer of 218 BCE. The Roman troops disembarked at Emporia (Latin:Emporiae, now Ampurias). Emporia was a Greek trading settlement located on the Spanish coast at the foot of the eastern end of the Pyrenees (see Figure 2). They were founded by nearby Massalia (now Marseille), which was a Greek polis allied with Rome, located on the coast of southern Gaul23.
Hannibal entrusted his younger brother, Hasdrubal Barkas, with command of the entire Carthaginian forces left to defend Spain24.
Soon the first clash between the Romans and the Carthaginians took place. In the fall of 218 BCE, at the Battle of Cissa (Latin: Cissis), Gnaeus Scipio managed to defeat a Carthaginian force of about 11,000. warriors led by a certain Hannon, Hannibal left this unit north of the Iber River to supervise the Iberian tribes, which had just been subjugated to Carthage during his march to Italy. The victory at Cissa, located near Tarrakona (Latin:Tarraco,now Tarragona) or Tarrakona, which is the Iberian name, allowed the Romans to establish permanent control over the area of Spain between the Pyrenees and the Iber River. Occupied Tarrakona, however, became a Roman base against the Carthaginian dominium in Spain25.
In the following 217 BCE, in a sea battle that took place at the mouth of the Iber River, the Roman fleet under the command of Gnaeus Scipio defeated the Carthaginian fleet under the command of Hasdrubal Barca. As a result of this victory, the Romans secured permanent dominance over the Carthaginian fleet in Spain until the end of the war. The victories of Gnaeus Scipio resulted in the senate’s decision to send his brother Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain in the same year 217 BCE (the same one who returned to Italy from the Rhone a year earlier, intending to stop Hannibal after leaving the Alps). He brought reinforcements numbering 8,000. on foot and on horseback, and a huge amount of supplies. In 215 BCE, at the Battle of Ibera (also called the “Battle of Dertosa”), the Scipios won an important victory over Hasdrubal Barkas, who with a newly recruited army moved to meet them with the intention of defeating the Roman army operating in Spain and then joining his brother at the head of the gathered forces. in Italy. The Battle of Ibera, which was victorious for Rome, did not resolve the war in Spain, but nevertheless it effectively prevented Hannibal from providing reinforcements in a very sensitive period for Rome, resulting from the devastating defeat a year earlier at the Battle of Cannae. The Battle of Ibera is interesting for another reason, namely that Hasdrubal used tactics similar to those used by Hannibal at Cannae, which, however, in this case ended with a severe defeat of the Carthaginian army. The victory at Ibera, together with the diplomatic action skillfully conducted by the Scipio brothers, also had the effect of causing some Iberian tribes south of the Iber River to move to the Roman side26.
The defeats suffered by the Carthaginians also caused unrest and rebellions among the Iberian tribes living in the southern areas of Spain still controlled by Carthage. Having to suppress the rebellions of the Iberian tribes, the Carthaginians were pushed to the defensive, using the bulk of their forces to calm the situation in their rear. Thus, in the next few years after the victory at Ibera, the Romans were able to establish control over a strip of the Mediterranean coast extending far to the south of the Iber River. In 212 BCE, the Scipio brothers even regained Sagunt, whose capture by Hannibal 7 years earlier had caused the outbreak of war. The situation on the Iberian Peninsula became increasingly difficult for Carthage (see Figure 2). In this situation, it was still impossible for Hasdrubal to send his brother Hannibal the much-awaited reinforcements that would help him regain the initiative in Italy. Moreover, the successes of the Scipio brothers in Spain contributed to the fact that most of the reinforcements that Hannibal was to receive from Carthage had to be sent to Spain instead of Italy. By 211 BCE, Hasdrubal Barca’s forces in Spain were reinforced with two armies recruited in Africa. One of them was brought by Hannibal’s youngest brother – Magon – who, after Hannibal’s victory at Cannae, was sent by him from Italy to Carthage to inform the metropolis about the great victory and at the same time ask for reinforcements. The second army was brought by Hasdrubal, called Giscon (not to be confused with Hannibal’s brother, who was still in command in Spain). The reinforcements received by Hasdrubal Barcas caused the situation in Spain, unfavorable for Carthage, to unexpectedly reverse27.
In 211 BCE, both Roman generals felt confident enough to start a campaign much further south of the Iber River than they had previously operated, as far as the upper reaches of the Betis River (Latin: Beatis, currently Guadalquivir). They decided to catch and defeat the Carthaginian armies in the field and thus victoriously end the war in Spain. After being reinforced with a contingent of 20,000 Iberian warriors provided by those Iberian tribes that had defected to the Roman side, they divided the forces they now had into two. Publius Scipio led two-thirds of the Roman army (i.e. the Romans and their Italian allies) against the armies of Mago and Hasdrubal Giscon. However, his brother Gnaeus Scipio, with one third of the Roman army supplemented by Iberian allies, headed towards the army of Hasdrubal Barkas. Thus, as it soon turned out, the Scipio brothers made a fatal mistake. They underestimated neither the still great influence of Hasdrubal Barkas on the Iberian tribes, nor the variability of the latter. As a result of secret negotiations and generous monetary donations, Hasdrubal Barkas regained the loyalty of the Iberian tribes who supported the Romans militarily. As a result, at the most important moment of the campaign, Iberian warriors in Roman service abandoned them, claiming that they had heard news of the Carthaginian invasion of their homeland, to which they must return. First, the army of Publius Scipio was defeated and moved against the armies of Mago and Hasdrubal Giscon. Already while marching towards the armies of Magon and Hasdrubal Giskon, the Roman forces were constantly harassed by the Numidian cavalry led by the Numidian prince Massinissa who came from Africa. Soon, news reached Publius Scipio that the Iberian leader Andobales (Indibilis), allied with Magon and Hasdrubal Giscon, leading 7.5 thousand troops, was heading towards him. Iberian warriors. Publius decided to break away from the Numidian cavalry harassing him at night and moved as quickly as possible towards the approaching Iberian unit, wanting to prevent it from joining the armies of Magon and Hasdrubal Giskon. However, the plan failed. The Roman commander caught the approaching Iberians, but after he engaged them in battle, the Numidian cavalry caught up and attacked him, and in addition, Magon and Hasdrubal Giskon managed to arrive with their armies. Surrounded on all sides, Publius Scipio died, along with most of the army he commanded. After being abandoned by his Iberian allies, Gnaeus Scipio, lonely and with too few forces, began to retreat. During the retreat, however, he was caught up by the Numidian cavalry, which harassed him so effectively that Hasdrubal Barkas came and, after the pogrom of Publius Scipio, was joined by the armies of Magon and Hasdrubal Giscon. Forced to fight a numerically superior enemy, Gnaeus managed to take up a defensive position on a rocky hill, where he tried to defend himself behind improvised fortifications hastily prepared from army luggage tied together. These fortifications, however, were of little use in the face of a much larger enemy who broke through them shortly after the battle began. Geneius Scipio was killed in battle and the forces he commanded were routed (see fig. 2)28.
When both Scipios died, the remnants of their defeated army retreated to northern Spain. The complete destruction of the Roman forces in Spain was prevented by: Lucius Marcius – a military tribune in the army of the dead Publius Scipio and Tiberius Fonteius – a legate in the army of the late Geneius Scipio. Together they gathered the soldiers who survived the defeat of both armies and fortified the camp on the north side of the Ebro River. The Roman soldiers who survived the pogrom unanimously chose Lucius Marcius as their leader. Soon, news of the defeat and death of the Scipio brothers reached Rome. The Roman Senate, in the same year 211 BCE, sent a new commander to Spain to take command of the remnants of the Roman army. It was Gaius Claudius Nero. In the late fall of 211 BCE, he took command of the decimated Roman forces with the rank of propraetor. He also supplemented them with 10,000 meals he brought with him. legionnaires and their Italian allies, as well as approx. 1 thousand driving. Nero stayed in Spain for a short time, only until 210 BCE. During this period, however, he reorganized the Roman forces so much that they managed to maintain defensive positions north of the Iber River (see Fig. 3)29.
Although the defeat and death of both Scipio brothers in the battle on the upper course of the Betis River returned the situation of the Romans in Spain to that of 218 BCE, despite achieving a great victory, the Carthaginian generals did not achieve the most important goal of the campaign, that is, the final push of the Romans from Spain and obtaining full operational freedom in this war theater (see Figure 3)30. This was a mistake that resulted in serious consequences for Carthage in the near future.
Publius Cornelius Scipio comes to Spain, or more about the situation of the parties to the conflict in Spain in the years 210 to 207 BCE
In 210 BCE, the Roman Senate recalled Gaius Claudius Nero from Spain. Publius Cornelius Scipio was chosen as the new commander of the Roman army in Spain. He was the son of Publius Scipio and nephew of Gnaeus Scipio, who died in Spain a year earlier. The election of Publius Cornelius Scipio as commander-in-chief of the Roman forces in Spain was quite unprecedented. The new leader was not only a very young man, less than 26 years old, but he had also never held a higher office than cural edilate. This means that he took command of the army entrusted to him on the principle of privatus cum imperio, i.e. as an ordinary citizen endowed with military power (imperium). This was unusual because theimperium pro consulewith which he was endowed could only be bestowed upon a retiring consul or praetor. And although when considering the choice of Publius Cornelius Scipio as the commander-in-chief of the Roman forces in Spain, one should not forget that he came from a very influential patrician family, it seems that the personal charm that the young leader was able to exude around him was also important. After the dismissal of Gaius Claudius Nero, the Senate most likely opted to send a relative of the killed Scipios to Spain, who could naturally take over and maintain the bonds that the fallen leaders had established with the leaders of the Iberian tribes. In this situation, the personal charm and the gift of winning people over, which characterized the very young Scipio, were certainly an attribute not to be despised when senators were considering the candidate for commander-in-chief of an army operating in such a difficult area as tribal Spain. Interestingly, ancient sources mention that as an 18-year-old youth, Scipio took part in the battle on the Ticinus River in 218 BCE. In this battle, the Roman troops with the rank of consul were commanded by young Scipio’s father. At one point, the consul was wounded and, together with a small unit, surrounded on all sides by enemies. Then young Scipio, regardless of the danger that threatened him, dashed through the enemy ranks with a bold charge and rescued his father from the predicament, saving him from certain death. It is not certain whether he took part in the battle of Trebia. He took part in the battle of pod Kannami in 216 BCE, in which he distinguished himself as tribune military. He survived the defeat of the Roman army only because, at the beginning of the battle, Hannibal’s cavalry beat the Roman cavalry, forcing it to flee. This accident meant that he was not encircled with the rest of the Roman army, which was almost completely annihilated by the Carthaginians. Despite his young age and lack of experience in commanding an army as a consul or praetor, the election of Publius Cornelius Scipio as the commander of the Roman army in Spain turned out to be one of the most accurate personal choices that the Roman Senate made in the entire Second Punic War31.
Scipio arrived in Emporia in Spain in the summer of 210 BCE, bringing with him approximately 10,000 people. pedestrians, 1 thousand cavalry, a squadron of ships and Marcus Junius Silanus, assigned to his aid by the senate (in the rank of propretor). From Emporia, at the head of the army he brought, he marched overland to the Roman base in Tarrakona. There he gathered the chiefs of the surrounding Iberian tribes and gave them a speech intended to encourage them and keep them in alliance with Rome. At that time, many Iberian tribes, which had until recently supported his father and uncle, after their deaths in the battle on the upper course of the Betis River, again switched to the Punic side (see fig. 3)32.
The reinforcements brought by Scipio increased the number of Roman forces in Spain to approximately 28,000. pedestrians and 3 thousand driving. These were significant forces, but their numbers were inferior to those of Hasdrubal Barkas, numbering approximately 70,000. pedestrians and horses33.
Shortly after his arrival, Scipio began to develop a plan to attack New Carthage, which was the capital of the Carthaginian rule in Spain. In 209 BCE, after boldly marching south and covering approximately 450 km, he surprised the small garrison left to defend the capital and captured it after a relatively short siege. He accomplished this before any of the three Carthaginian armies remaining in the field managed to come to the aid of the besieged capital. The capture of New Carthage by the Romans was a serious blow to the military potential of the Carthaginians. Scipio not only captured the treasury gathered in this city and was used to finance Carthage’s military operations, but also took over all the war equipment stored in the capital, workshops producing weapons along with the craftsmen serving them, and, above all, permanently moved the scope of Roman influence in Spain far to south of the Iber River. After conquering the city, Scipio freed the representatives of local Iberian tribes captured there, thanks to which many of them crossed over to the Roman side. After the conquest of New Carthage, the headquarters of the Carthaginians in Spain became the old Phoenician colony of Gades (now Cadiz). Although the capture of New Carthage significantly worsened the situation of Carthage in Spain, it did not mean the end of the war in this area. There were still three Carthaginian armies operating in Spain, each of which was almost as numerous as Scipio’s 34.
The next year – 208 BCE – Scipio again took the initiative and moved towards the south of Spain with the intention of defeating the army of Hasdrubal Barkas, which was closest to his position. Hasdrubal Barkas with approximately 26,000 the army wintered near the town of Bekula (Latin: Baecula), in the upper reaches of the Betis River (Latin: Beatis, now Guadalquivir). In the light of later events , it seems that the Carthaginian commanders operating in Spain had previously agreed that Hasdrubal Barkas would leave Spain and lead his forces towards Italy to join Hannibal, who was waiting for reinforcements. After the two armies came into contact, Hasdrubal moved his camp to a strong defensive position. It was a high hill protected by ravines on the sides and a river in front and behind. The hill was divided by two steep cliffs, which flattened and widened at their highest points, creating something like terraces. Forces could be deployed on these terraces if necessary and they could be effectively defended. From this moment of events, the messages of Livy and Polybius begin to differ. According to Livy, Hasdrubal formed a battle line on a hill during the first night and waited there for Scipio, who attacked him. However, according to Polybius, Scipio waited for two days for a possible move from Hasdrubal, but the latter did not make any maneuvers. Scipio, fearing the arrival of the other two Carthaginian armies, decided to attack Hasdrubal’s positions on the third day. The attacked Hasdrubal tried to quickly form a battle line, but it was too late and, flanked by the legions, he was beaten. However, he managed to escape from the battle site with most of his army. Polybius’ message, however, raises some doubts, because it is hard to believe that such an experienced leader as Hasdrubal was surprised, even in a situation where his defensive position on a steep hill was an excellent vantage point over the plain surrounding the hill. Moreover, the question arises if – as Polybius claims – Scipio’s attack was so unexpected that the Carthaginian army was outflanked, then why the majority of this army managed to escape from the closing encirclement after all. Hasdrubal was probably waiting for the arrival of the two remaining Carthaginian armies in order to gain a numerical advantage over the Roman army. However, the reinforcements did not arrive. He therefore decided to avoid confrontation with Scipio and began preparations to leave his place of stationing. However, he did not do it quickly enough and was attacked by Scipio and had to defend himself. In the first attempt, Scipio sent light troops into battle, which attacked the center of Hasdrubal’s forces. He responded by moving his light troops and Numidian cavalry to the lower plateau. Hasdrubal apparently sent the light troops to gain time in leading the rest of the army out of the camp and across the river. However, when the first line of defense fell, Hasdrubal was forced to send some of his heavily armed troops to the top of the hill, which supported the retreating light troops and on the next line of defense engaged the approaching Roman formations. Scipio responded to Hasdrubal’s move by dividing his remaining heavy infantry into two equal parts. He then sent each of these troops with the task of going around the hill and attacking the Carthaginian forces defending on its top from both flanks. And although Scipio won the battle as a result of this maneuver, his forces were stopped long enough by the Carthaginian forces defending on the hill to enable Hasdrubal to effectively break away from Scipio’s army and escape from the battlefield with his elephants, treasury, and as it were intact. he estimates from one-half to two-thirds of the best part of the army. It is confirmed in ancient sources that Hasdrubal’s army had elephants at their disposal, which were sent to the rear before the battle. This would only confirm the assumption that since Hasdrubal did not gain a numerical advantage, instead of engaging in a fight with Scipio, which would always carry the risk of defeat, he wanted, above all, to remove as much of his subordinate army as possible from Spain, with the intention of joining his brother in Italy . It is true that in order to break away from Scipio’s army, he had to sacrifice some of his own forces, but these were mainly light troops and Iberian allies, whose loss was not severe. Therefore, Carthage’s defeat at Becula was not significant in the military aspect, but in the political aspect it weakened its influence in Spain. After the battle, subsequent Iberian tribes defected to Rome, and Scipio was even hailed as king by the local Iberian leaders, which he did not accept, instead allowing himself to be called emperor. Scipio spent the rest of the year strengthening alliances with the Iberian tribes offering them, and then retreated to his base at Tarrakona. Hasdrubal Barcas, on the other hand, broke away from Scipio and moved with the remaining part of his army to the north of Spain, intending to leave it and join his brother in Italy. However, two other Carthaginian armies were still operating in Spain. One of them was commanded by Hasdrubal Giskon. The second one was Magon Barkas (Hannibal’s youngest brother)35.
In the following 207 BCE, Scipio was therefore faced with two mutually insuring Carthaginian armies, each ready to come to the aid of the other should he attack either of them. Additionally, the Carthaginian forces in Spain were reinforced with reinforcements brought by Hannon (an unknown Carthaginian leader) from Africa. These reinforcements joined Magon’s army. Despite the reinforcements received, Magon decided to further strengthen the forces at his disposal by starting new recruitments among the Iberians. Scipio, wanting to eliminate the enemy’s advantage, decided to take a risk and decided to attack Magon’s army. He intended to defeat Magon’s forces before he strengthened them by completing the recruitment of Iberian warriors. For this purpose, he sent part of his troops against Magon under the command of his trusted subordinate – Marcus Junius Silanus (approx. 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry). Marcus Silanus, marching at great speed, managed to make contact with Magon’s army, which was accompanied by newly enlisted Iberians. Magon’s forces camped in a well-guarded camp. The newly recruited Iberian warriors camped separately, not even adequately insuring their camping place. The freedom with which they behaved in war conditions, combined with the lack of proper insurance of the place of their camp, indicated poor discipline and low morale of these units. It was these troops that Marcus Sylanus decided to attack first. The Roman leader was not mistaken in his calculations. The Iberians, who were not expecting the attack, were quickly defeated and dispersed. During the fight, Hannon was also captured. Although Magon helped the attacked Iberians, due to their complete defeat and suffering heavy losses, he had to break away from the enemy and with his remaining forces joined the army of Hasdrubal Giskon. However, Magon’s defeat meant the destruction of a large part of one of the Carthaginian armies operating in Spain, the remains of which were forced to join the army of Hasdrubal Giskon. The Carthaginians therefore lost the tactical advantage in the field that had been provided by the existence and mutual insurance of two operating armies. Thus, Hasdrubal Giscon was left alone in the face of Scipio’s army marching towards him. Lacking a tactical advantage over Scipio, the Carthaginian commander decided to avoid battle by dispersing his forces among numerous fortified Spanish cities and strongholds. He prolonged the war in Spain, but he could not achieve victory over the Romans this way. It certainly did not restore the recognition of the Carthaginians in the eyes of the Iberian tribes, which began to lean more and more towards the victorious Scipio. Giskon, however, could afford such a move because, assuming the successful joining of Hasdrubal Barkas to Hannibal in Italy, the outcome of the war could be expected in this theater of war, and not in Spain. Scipio understood that further fighting against the scattered Carthaginian forces would require him to waste time and strength on conquering further cities and strongholds. With winter approaching, he withdrew with all his strength to the winter quarters of Tarrakona. Scipio’s campaign of 207 BCE therefore ended without further major action36.
Hazdrubal Barkas comes to Italy, or the situation of the parties to the conflict in Italy in the years 210 to 207 BCE
Since the loss of Capua, Hannibal’s situation in Italy has deteriorated further. Late in 210 BCE, the Romans achieved another important success and captured the Sicilian port city of Akragas (Latin: Agrigentum, now Agrigento), which was in the hands of the Carthaginians. By 209 BCE, all of Sicily was pacified. In the same year 209 BCE, the Carthaginians lost Salapia in Apulia, and, worse still, Tarentum, which was the main port of southern Italy (just as a reminder, it should be mentioned that in the same year Scipio captured New Carthage in Spain)37. It is true that war fatigue among the Roman allies had become so great that in 209 BCE twelve of the thirty Latin colonies refused to provide Rome with recruits and subsidies, but despite this open insubordination towards the Roman hegemon, none of the Roman colonies defected to the side of the Carthaginian leader 38. In 208 BCE, in an ambush organized by Hannibal on the border of Apulia and Lucania, the consul Marcus Claudius Marcellus (conqueror of Syracuse) was killed, and the second consul, Titus Quinctius Crispinus, was seriously wounded and died shortly thereafter of his injuries. It was an unprecedented event in the history of Rome, because never before had two consuls died in one battle. Despite this undoubted success, Hannibal failed to reverse the generally unfavorable situation in which he found himself, and the area he controlled in southern Italy began to shrink, leaving him less and less freedom of movement 39.
At the same time (208 BCE), Hasdrubal, having broken away from Scipio’s army, was moving with his remaining forces along the Tagus River towards the Pyrenees. After the army was supplemented with recruitment carried out in the central part of Iberia, the so-called Celtiberia (through which his route ran), he crossed the Pyrenees in their western part, getting to Gaul. He was forced to spend the winter of 208/207 BCE in Gaul. In the spring of 207 BCE, he started crossing the Alps. Hasdrubal marched across the Alps more quickly than his brother had 11 years earlier, partly because of the structures left behind by Hannibal’s army, but also because of a change in the attitude of the Gallic tribes who had harassed Hannibal during his march. These tribes were not only afraid of the Carthaginians, but also already knew that the Carthaginian army was only passing through their headquarters, so they were not hostile to the intruders. Hasdrubal reached the Po Valley in northern Italy in the spring of 207 BCE. Here, the ranks of his army increased by about 8,000. Ligurians, increasing his forces to approximately 30,000. warriors. Hasdrubal, like his brother 11 years earlier, also managed to lead war elephants across the Alps40.
The fact that Hasdrubal managed to cross the Pyrenees and move towards Italy was notified to Rome in 208 BCE by the legation of the Greek polis of Massalia (now Marseille), allied with Rome. So although the Romans (remembering the series of devastating defeats they had suffered at the hands of Hannibal a few years earlier) were seriously concerned about the prospect of fighting two Carthaginian armies in Italy, the appearance of Hasdrubal in Italy was not a surprise to them In the consular elections taking place in the spring of 207 BCE, Gaius Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius Salinator were elected new consuls. Claudius Nero was sent against Hannibal’s forces in southern Italy. Marcus Salinator was sent against the army of Hasdrubal Barkas, who came to northern Italy 42.
Hannibal learned that Hasdrubal had managed to leave Spain and set out for Italy at the head of a large army. However, he did not know what his brother was going to do after arriving in Italy. So Hannibal did not know whether Hasdrubal would open a permanent second front in northern Italy, waiting for him to try to break through to it? Or will he march south to join forces with Hannibal. If Hasdrubal’s intention was to break through to the south, Hannibal did not know which way Hasdrubal would go and where he would meet him. The situation was made worse by the fact that in 207 BCE Hannibal was blocked in southern Italy by Nero’s forces, numbering over 40,000 against him. legionaries and their Italian allies. These forces were too numerous and too formidable for Hannibal to risk giving them an open battle. Not knowing what his brother was planning after arriving in Italy, he and Nero engaged in a maneuvering war full of numerous marches and minor skirmishes. However, he wasted time and strength fighting the Romans in minor battles which, although victorious, did not change his overall unfavorable position in Italy and could not ensure a favorable outcome of the war. It seems that at this crucial moment in the war, there was a lack of information flow and coordination of mutual actions between the brothers, as a result of which Hannibal was reluctant to take more energetic actions to reach Hasdrubal when he descended from the Alps to the Po Plain. In this way he enabled the Romans to take the initiative43.
After arriving in northern Italy, Hasdrubal set out with the intention of joining his brother operating in the south. Marcus Salinator’s forces sent against him cautiously yielded and allowed him to advance beyond the Metaurus River (now Metauro) to the vicinity of the city of Sena (now Senigallia). At some point during his march towards the south of Italy, Hasdrubal sent messengers with letters to Hannibal. These messengers managed to reach southern Italy, but they did not manage to reach Hannibal because they were captured near Tarentum. Hasdrubal’s plans fell into the hands of the consul Claudius Nero, with whom Hannibal conducted a war of maneuvers. In the letters received from the messengers, Hasdrubal pointed to Umbria – a land located in central Italy – as a place of possible connection with his brother. Nero, realizing the huge threat posed by combining the armies of both brothers, decided to counteract it. The army he commanded was in contact with Hannibal, so its sudden disappearance could arouse the Carthaginian commander’s suspicions and cause him to counteract. To avoid this, he separated PLN 7,000 from it. unit (including 1,000 cavalry) and at the head of this unit, on a forced march that went unnoticed by Hannibal, he joined the forces of Marcus Salinator retreating in the north of Italy before the approaching Hasdrubal. The addition of the forces brought by Nero to Salinator resulted in the Roman forces gaining a numerical advantage over the Carthaginian forces. It is estimated that after the unit brought by Claudius Nero joined the army of Marcus Salinator, the number of Roman forces increased to 40,000. pedestrians and horses. Having gained numerical advantage, the combined Roman armies immediately blocked Hasdrubal’s path, intending to give him battle. As soon as he noticed that he was dealing with two consuls, the Carthaginian leader tried to break away from the enemy and change the route of his march, but due to the betrayal of his guides who suddenly abandoned him, he wandered around in unfamiliar terrain and was overtaken by Nero and his pursuers. Salinator. In the battle that finally took place on the banks of the Metaurus River, the Roman forces led by Marcus Livius Salinator and Gaius Claudius Nero won after a fierce fight and defeated the army with which Hasdrubal had come to support his brother. When, at the end of the battle, Hasdrubal realized that it was already lost, he decided to throw himself into the enemy and die heroically in battle together with his warriors. After winning the battle, the Romans cut off Hasdrubal’s head and threw it to Hannibal’s camp, which was still in southern Italy and unaware of the events that had taken place. They also released two commanders of Hasdrubal’s army, whom they ordered to go to Hannibal’s camp to report to the Carthaginian commander the events they had witnessed. After destroying the reinforcements led by his brother, Hannibal immediately withdrew with his remaining army to the farthest edge of the “Italian boot”, i.e. to Bruttium, to which he also evacuated all the garrisons of the cities in Lucania that were subordinate to him. The inhabitants of Metapontus were evacuated to this region, as well as other Lucan cities allied with Carthage, which Hannibal could no longer defend with his remaining forces44.
So when Hasdrubal Giscon, commanding the remaining Carthaginian forces in Spain, dispersed them among numerous fortified Spanish cities and strongholds to avoid confrontation with Scipio in the hope that both brothers would successfully resolve the war in Italy, he did not yet know that Hasdrubal Barkas had just suffered a defeat. over Metaurus, unable to connect with Hannibal.
The outcome of the war again began to depend on how it would unfold in Spain.
Battle of Ilipa of 206 BCE
At the beginning of the next year – 206 BCE – news of the death of Hasdrubal Barkas and the rout of his army on the Metaurus River in Italy must have reached Spain. In this situation, the strategy of prolonging the war in Spain until it was resolved on the fields of Italy, chosen by Hasdrubal Giscon, was no longer valid. Hannibal still did not receive the support he needed and was isolated by the Romans in Bruttium, and the defensive strategy of avoiding a major battle with the Roman forces and protecting Carthaginian influence in Spain based on fortified cities with troops not only failed to restore Carthaginian influence among the Iberian tribes, but in the circumstances, there was even a risk of losing them further. Iberian tribes began to notice the weakness of Carthage in the confrontation with Rome and increasingly left the former. And even if they did not join Rome, they remained neutral and stopped supporting Carthage. The tide of the war could only turn around if the Roman forces operating in Spain were destroyed. In this way, the Carthaginians would not only regain influence among the Iberian tribes, but could make another attempt to send reinforcements to Hannibal. Both Carthaginian commanders understood the seriousness of the situation and therefore decided to give battle to the Roman forces in Spain with the intention of their final annihilation45.
In the following year 206 BCE, Hasdrubal Giskon set out with his gathered forces up the Betis River. Near the city of Karmony, Hannibal’s youngest brother – Magon – joined his forces with the forces of Hasdrubal Giskon. After creating a powerful army, both Carthaginian commanders continued their march up the Betis River, determined to deal with the Roman forces in Iberia and thus regain the increasingly shrinking Carthaginian influence there. Hasdrubal Giskon took command of the entire combined Carthaginian forces. Scipio also wanted to fight and therefore went to meet the Carthaginian generals. In the spring of 206 BCE, the two armies met near the town of Ilipa in the Betis River valley, which was used to name the battle fought nearby. The opponents’ camps were set up on hills allowing them to observe each other. The Carthaginian army set up camp on an unnamed hill 5 km southwest of present-day Pelagus. The Roman army set up camp on a hill now called Pelegatos, about 6 km east of today’s city of Burguillos. Both camps were located 6 to 10.5 km northeast of today’s Alcala del Rio. Between the hills there was a plain where the sides decided to fight46.
The Punic army outnumbered the Roman forces. Hasdrubal Giskon gathered a powerful force of about 75,000. warriors. They consisted of infantry, cavalry and war elephants. The infantry units numbered about 70,000 and included about 20,000. Carthaginian and African (Libyan) heavy infantry47 and 50,000 Iberian infantry. The cavalry force was 4.5 thousand. riders. The whole was to be supported by 32 war elephants48. The forces with which Scipio approached Ilipa amounted to approximately 48,000. They included 45 thousand. infantry, including about 25 thousand Roman and Italian infantry and 20,000 allied Iberian infantry. There are approximately 3,000 cavalry. riders49.
A comparison of the forces of both armies leads to the conclusion that the forces of Carthage and Rome were more or less equal in terms of selected troops, because 20,000. heavy infantry consisting of Carthaginians and Africans (Libyans)50 corresponded to about 25,000. Roman legionaries and their Italian allies (Italics). However, Hasdrubal Giscon had a decisive advantage over Scipio in the Iberian infantry. Carthage’s clear advantage was also visible in cavalry. Additionally, the entire Carthaginian forces were supported by over 30 war elephants, which the Romans did not have at their disposal. In total, the Carthaginians’ advantage over the Roman forces was very large and reached almost 30,000. armed.
The clash that soon took place can be divided into three phases, each of which was a consequence of the events that took place in the previous phase and resulted directly from it. Thus, we can distinguish the phase of maneuvers and military actions of the parties before the actual battle, the actual battle and, finally, the maneuvers and military actions of the parties after the actual battle.
Maneuvers and military actions of the parties before the actual battle
The military actions of the parties that met on the fields of Ilipa began when both armies made visual contact. While still working to break up the camp, the Romans were attacked by Numidian cavalry under the command of Masinissa (a Numidian prince in the service of Carthage). With this move, Hasdrubal Giskon wanted to surprise the Romans and, by causing confusion in their ranks, inflict the greatest possible losses on them before the decisive battle. If his plan had succeeded, it would certainly have lowered the morale of the Roman forces before the actual battle took place51. Scipio, however, predicted this development. He prepared an ambush for such an eventuality by hiding his own cavalry behind a hill from the enemy’s view, which, when the Carthaginian cavalry attacked, attacked its flank, inflicting serious losses on it and forcing it to retreat. Therefore, from the very beginning, the offensive actions carried out by Hasdrubal Giskon brought the Carthaginian forces the opposite effect than expected 52. Relatively little happened over the next few days, or so it seemed to the Carthaginians. For several days in a row, both commanders led their armies out of the camp and placed them in battle formation on the plain. Hasdrubal Giscon always led his army out of the camp first, and in response, Scipio also led his army out of the camp. So the armies left the camps, stood in formation facing each other for many hours, and when the day was drawing to a close, Hasdrubal was the first to order the retreat of his army to the camp. Only after that, Scipio ordered the retreat to the Roman army camp. The armies were brought out onto the plain only in the afternoon, and they formed lines near their camps, which clearly signaled that the commanders commanding them were not in a hurry to start the fight. However, while the daily repetition of such maneuvers by both armies – as it soon turned out – was useful to Hasdrubal, Scipio drew far-reaching conclusions from them, which determined his careful planning of the upcoming clash. During these few days, Scipio only apparently submitted to these ritual maneuvers carried out by both armies, which were in combat readiness and stood opposite each other for several hours. In fact, he carefully observed and analyzed the formation of the Carthaginian army. He noticed that Hasdrubal Giscon always placed Carthaginian and African heavy infantry in the center of his army, which constituted the most combative, and therefore the most dangerous for the Roman legions, core of his forces. The Iberian infantry was placed on the wings by the Carthaginian commander. From the front, the Iberians were protected by elephants, and the flanks were protected by cavalry. Scipio organized his army in the same way as Hasdrubal Giscon. In the middle, the position was occupied by heavily armed infantry consisting of the Romans and their Italian allies. However, the Iberian infantry allied with the Roman leader occupied the wings. The positioning of both armies suggested that the best troops of both sides would meet and engage in the center, and that it was in this section that the decision would be made. However, Scipio understood something else. He understood that with such an arrangement of both armies, the Iberians allied with him would have to clash on the wings with their countrymen in the Carthaginian service53. He knew the instability of Rome’s Iberian allies and knew that their defection to Carthage at a key moment in the campaign against its forces in 211 BCE had led to the death of his father and uncle at the upper reaches of the Betis River and the annihilation of almost the entire Roman army in Spain. The conclusion that came to the Roman commander must therefore have been that in the coming battle he could rely only on the Roman infantry and that the outcome of the coming battle would depend on the way this infantry was used on the battlefield54. The moment was coming for a general clash between the two leaders.
The battle proper, or “Cannae reversed”
The day before the general clash, Scipio gave orders for the soldiers to get up early the next day, eat breakfast, prepare weapons and groom their horses, and be ready to fight before dawn. In the morning of the next day, before the entire army had been taken out of the camp to form an formation, Scipio ordered the cavalry and units of lightly armed skirmishers (Latin:velites,Polish: velites) an order to attack the camp posts of the Carthaginian army. The attacked camp guards immediately raised the alarm. The attack on the sleeping camp and the simultaneous formation of the Roman army on the nearby plain caused great confusion in the hastily waking up Carthaginian camp. Expecting an imminent attack by the Romans, Hasdrubal ordered the entire army to leave the camp as quickly as possible and form a battle line. In such a situation, the Carthaginian warriors would of course have no food to eat before the expected many hours of fighting. In order to resist the bold Roman raiders and skirmishers, Hasdrubal sent troops matching their type of weapons to meet them and, under their protection, quickly began to form his own army. The center of the Carthaginian forces was occupied by Carthaginian and African heavy infantry, while the wings were occupied by the infantry of Iberian allies in front of whose positions were occupied by war elephants. The cavalry was deployed on the flanks of the Iberian infantry. When the Carthaginian army finally took position, Hasdrubal was surprised to find that the formation of the Roman troops standing opposite was completely different from the one that had taken place so far. The center of the Roman army was now occupied by Iberian allies, while the wings were occupied by select Roman and Italian infantry units. The distance, the rush caused by the unexpected Roman attack, the dust raised by the fighting cavalry and light-armed units, and the masses of troops moving to their positions meant that Hasdrubal simply did not notice the Roman troops preparing in the opposite order than the formation to which Scipio had accustomed him on the over the last few days. When he realized that his Iberian troops were to engage on the flanks with the excellent Roman and Italian infantry, it was too late to change the positioning of his own army (see Fig. 4)55.
Hasdrubal must have been aware that changing the formation of the gathered masses of people would take a longer period of time, and Scipio, alert and ready to attack, noticing the confusion in the formations of the Carthaginian army, would not allow a beneficial regrouping to be carried out and during its execution he would probably attack the maneuvering Carthaginian units, quickly bringing about to destroy the entire army. This was all the more likely because the valley separating the camps of both armies came under the control of the Roman army. Anticipating such a scenario, Scipio, not without reason, ordered his army to prepare for battle much further from his camp than had been the case so far. Giskon had no choice but to accept the battle in the formation in which he had prepared his army. How surprised he must have been when it turned out that after his army had lined up, the expected Roman attack did not take place. For several hours, there were only loose skirmishes between lightly armed skirmishers of both armies. This apparent inaction of the Roman army, however, was part of Scipio’s plan to tire the Carthaginian army before the decisive battle. Why Hasdrubal Giskon, having a huge numerical advantage over the Roman army, did not decide to launch an attack on the Roman positions first remains a mystery. After all, he must have finally realized that Scipio was deliberately postponing the confrontation, in a situation in which his soldiers were led out of the camp and prepared for battle in great haste without any food. It is impossible for him not to be aware of the fact that sleep-deprived and uninvigorated soldiers standing for many hours in the midday sun will eventually begin to lose their strength and enthusiasm for battle, and that delaying it further can only benefit Scipio, who, having decided to attack first, then – as you could guess – he probably reinforced his soldiers beforehand. Perhaps the next events of the day, i.e. the morning attack of the Roman army on the Carthaginian camp, the complete change in the formation of the Roman troops, Scipio’s failure to take further action after both armies were preparing to face each other – surprised Hasdrubal Giskon so much that he adopted a reactive attitude, not knowing what else he might do. expect. Or perhaps he thought that having a significant numerical advantage provided him with a sufficient tactical advantage over the enemy to offset the unfavorable circumstances that Scipio’s actions had created for his forces so far. Whatever the truth, by remaining waiting for what Scipio would do, he lost the chance to take the initiative, which could have ended a number of unfavorable circumstances that had so far occurred for the Carthaginian forces. By taking the initiative, he could also try to force Scipio to fight the battle on his own terms. However, by remaining passive, he behaved exactly as Scipio expected, and thus he unknowingly enabled him to implement his own plan for the upcoming battle56.
At one point, Scipio recalled the lightly armed skirmishers, who, in the gaps between the ranks of the Roman infantry, got to its rear and formed battle lines on both flanks. He then gave the order to attack. What happened now surprises more than one military theorist to this day57. At this point, however, it is best to give the floor to two historians whose works constitute the main source of knowledge about the course of the Second Punic War. One of them is the Greek historian Polybius of Megalopolis describing the history of the Roman state, and the other is the Roman historian Titus Livius. This is how Polybius described the maneuvers of Scipio’s army at Ilipa in his work entitled History:
Now he moved to attack, at first – with the entire line together. But at a distance of about one stage from the enemy, he ordered the Iberians to keep an eye on the lines and move forward to attack in the same way, and he gave the order to the wings to turn: maniples and squadrons to ride on the right wing to the right, on the left wing to the left. In turn, he was alone on the right wing, and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius on the left , took the first three squadrons, in front of them – as usual – lightly armed spearmen [we mean lightly armed javelinmen, or simply velites – note. AW], three infantry units, which in the Roman infantry are called cohorts, and when he turned to the left and the others to the right, they moved at right angles to the enemy, rushing to attack at a run. The others were constantly joining in and following them in a similar manner. When they were close to the enemy, and the Iberians in the front line were still at a sufficient distance from the meeting point, because they were attacking step by step, they attacked the Roman forces on the enemy’s wings from both sides at once at right angles, according to a preconceived plan.
The next movements, by which those in the rear, joining the previous ones in the same way and positioning themselves on a common line of battle with the opponent, had an opposite arrangement, in general when it comes to the right wing in relation to left, as in individual parts – infantry to cavalry. Namely, on the right wing, the cavalry and light armored troops joined from the right side of the line and tried to outflank the enemy, while the infantry, on the contrary, joined from the left. On the left wing – infantry in cohorts on the right, and cavalry and light armed forces on the left.
As a result of this maneuver, what was the right side of the horsemen and light armored men on both wings now became the left side. But the commander did not care much about this, rightly planning another, greater achievement – outflanking the enemy. You just need to know what the point is and use the shifts as they suit the needs of the moment. (…).
The infantry forces on the Carthaginian flanks were severely harassed, while the center of the front, composed of the Libyans who were the most important core of the army, was ultimately useless. These men and those on the wings could not come to the aid and leave their positions because of the threat from the Iberians who were ready to attack, nor could they do anything useful in their positions because the enemy in front did not approach them for hand-to-hand combat. przypis id=”58″].
– Polybius, Histories, XI, 22-24
However, the march of Scipio’s army at Ilipa towards the outskirts of the Carthaginian positions in the work entitled From the Foundation of the City was described by the Roman historian Titus Livus:
The time has come to enter the battle. Now Scipio ordered his Spaniards, who formed the center of the line, to advance at a slow pace, and he sent an order to Silanus and Marcius from the right wing, which he himself commanded, that, seeing as he extended his wing to the right, they also extended theirs to the left and with lightly armed infantry and cavalry they entered into battle with the enemy before the middle parts of the battle lines could engage each other. So, spreading out their wings, they advanced on each with three cohorts of infantry and three troops of cavalry, and also with light-armed troops, at a quick pace towards the enemy, and behind them others followed in a diagonal line, so that in the middle of the line, where the Spaniards advanced more slowly, a recess was created. And the wings had already started fighting, while the main Carthaginian forces, Punic veterans and Africans, had not yet approached the enemy, even within the distance of a javelin throw. And to the flanks, where they could help those already fighting, they did not dare to move away, lest the center of the line become open to the enemy advancing here . The wings were under double attack. The cavalry, light infantry and skirmishers surrounded the enemy in an arc and attacked him from the sides, while the cohorts advanced from the front and tried to break the enemy flanks from the rest of their battle line59.
– Titus Livius, From the Foundation of the City, XXVIII, 15
From both descriptions, a picture emerges of the complex maneuvers performed by the Roman army, especially its wings, heading towards the Carthaginian positions. It is worth trying to imagine what a march of almost 50,000 Roman forces might have looked like, heading with confident, measured steps to meet the 75,000-strong Roman forces. warriors of the Carthaginian army. Well, after Scipio gave the signal to attack, the Roman legions and their accompanying Iberian allies moved steadily towards the waiting Carthaginian ranks. At some point during this march, Scipio ordered the Roman infantry and cavalry of the right wing to turn to the right and the left wing to the left, forming columns that started marching parallel (according to Livy, diagonally) to the front of the Carthaginian army. At the same time, the center of the Roman forces, which consisted of the allied Iberian infantry, slowly continued to march straight towards the Carthaginian positions. Just for the sake of order, it should be added that after the turn, both Roman wings began to move away from their own center in opposite directions, while the center was still slowly approaching the center of the Carthaginian army standing opposite it (see Fig. 5).
A very interesting issue regarding the turning of both Roman wings in opposite directions is primarily the way this maneuver was carried out. This maneuver could be performed in two ways, i.e. either each of the infantrymen and horsemen turned to the right and left while remaining in their place, or each infantry and cavalry unit turned behind the first rank along its axis to the right and left. The professional military terminology used by Polybius when describing the maneuver indicates, however, that the turn was made by entire units behind the first rank along their axis (see Fig. 6), and not by individual foot and horsemen in these units, because Polybius would simply use a different way to describe this situation military terminology translated as turning towards the spear (i.e. to the right on the right wing) and turning towards the shield (i.e. to the left on the left wing).
The march of both Roman wings, formed into columns, continued until each of them reached the edge of the battle line of the Carthaginian army, or more precisely, the edge of each of its wings. After reaching approximately the edge of the Carthaginian army’s battle line, both Roman wings made a second turn. The columns of the right wing turned to the left and the left wing to the right, again forming columns, which this time faced their fronts towards the enemy’s line. The columns formed on both wings began to move at an accelerated pace (according to Polybius, “running to attack”), approaching the Iberian infantry formed on the Carthaginian wings. It should be explained that the transformation of the Roman army, previously arranged in battle lines, into columns had a clear purpose. A column will always move faster than a long battle front. It is also easier to keep order in a column. Finally, a long moving battle front would be much more likely to break, which in turn would require stopping and organizing it, and thus would create confusion and delay the execution of all planned maneuvers. The column, however, is simply not threatened. Therefore, if the Roman wings, after reaching the edge of the enemy’s battle line, instead of reforming into columns, started to reform into a line again in order to continue their advance towards the Carthaginian positions, the possible confusion and delay in the maneuvers could finally be taken advantage of by the enemy, who, after recovering from the surprise, would probably have guessed the Roman leader’s intention much earlier and decided to counteract it. Therefore, by forming both wings into columns with the second maneuver, which ran towards the Carthaginian lines, Scipio did not leave Hasdrubal any time to guess his intentions. When these became clear to the Carthaginian commander, it was too late to counteract (see Fig. 7).
As was the case with the first maneuver, in this case Polybius uses terminology referring to entire units turning along their axis (see Fig. 8).
After approaching to a distance of about 700 meters from the enemy, the Roman columns made a third turn and began to form battle lines60. The columns of the right wing formed a battle line towards the left, and the columns of the left wing towards the right. Forming back into battle lines, the Roman infantry units struck fiercely against the Iberian infantry forming the wings of the Carthaginian army. At the same time, the cavalry and velites columns, which had been in the outermost positions after the first turn, now found themselves on the fighting edges of each wing. Therefore, at the moment when the Roman infantry columns on each wing were reforming into battle fronts towards the center, the cavalry andvelites were emerging from behind the infantry on each wing and forming battle fronts towards the edges of the Carthaginian flanks, i.e. in directions opposite to the directions of formation of battle fronts by the Roman infantry (see Fig. 9).
Hence, when after the third turn the maniple ofhastati, principes and triariiwere arranged in the same order, from left to right, as before the first turn, the cavalry and the velites formed on the edges of the Carthaginian wings in the opposite order to their formation before the first maneuver with the task of attacking the Carthaginian forces from the side and partially from the rear. However, this was not an arrangement that would disturb the Roman commander in any way, because this was how he planned the battle, which is emphasized by Polybius himself, stating that: “you just need to know what the point is leading to, and use the shifts as they suit the need.” moment.” When mentioning the positioning of the Roman wings after the third turn, the Greek historian most likely intended to reflect as faithfully as possible the skill with which Scipio outflanked the enemy, rather than pointing to the weakness of the line of cavalry and velites, formed in the opposite order. (see Fig. 10).
After the cavalry and velites had formed battle fronts, of course these troops also immediately attacked both Carthaginian wings from their edges and from the rear – partially surrounding them. Moreover, the maneuvers of the Roman army’s wings took place so quickly and efficiently that the columns into which they were transformed managed to overtake the still slowly advancing center of the Roman forces, consisting of the Iberian infantry allied with them. So, while the fight against the Roman infantry, velites and cavalry had already begun on both wings of the Carthaginian army, the slowly marching Iberians still had not engaged the heavy-armed African infantry standing opposite their ranks, constituting the center of the army. Carthaginian. However, this was not an accident or an oversight but, as it turned out, Scipio’s intentional move (see Fig. 11).
The fight that took place on the wings of the Carthaginian army was very fierce. However, the much better trained Roman and Italian infantry had superior skills over the brave but much less trained Iberians. Lack of sleep and lack of a morning meal probably also took their toll on the Iberian warriors. Gradually, both Carthaginian wings began to give way under the Roman pressure towards the center. Hasdrubal, however, could not send reinforcements to the Iberians from his center, because he was afraid that when he started the maneuver of returning part or all of his forces to the center, the enemy, slowly but constantly approaching this center, would take advantage of this moment and fall on it to destroy it – which would ultimately it would have led to the imminent disaster of the entire Carthaginian army. Thus, throughout the entire period of fighting on the wings of the Carthaginian army, the heavily armed Carthaginian and African infantry forming its center stood useless, under the constant threat of the slowly advancing Iberians. Eventually, however, both wings of the Carthaginian army slowly but steadily began to collapse. Moreover, during the fight, the Roman infantry andvelites deliberately causing a lot of confusion and showering the war elephants charging at them with a hail of javelins, skillfully scared them away from their positions on the wings. They fled towards the Carthaginian center and, falling into it, trampled the Carthaginian warriors, causing quite a stir. What is noteworthy is the fact that both ancient historians are silent about what happened to the Carthaginian cavalry during the battle, therefore it is assumed that the panicking elephants most likely scared the Carthaginian cavalry, which fled and did not return to the battlefield (similar the situation occurred near Zama with Hannibal’s cavalry scared away by panicked elephants). When this happened, the entire Carthaginian army began to slowly retreat from the battlefield towards the hill where the camp was located. Hasdrubal Giskon realized that the battle was taking an unfavorable turn and, wanting to avoid the encirclement that would have to occur when the wings completely collapsed, he most likely wanted to retreat with his army enough to protect his rear from being surrounded by the slopes of the hill on which his camp, regroup forces and continue to resist the Romans in a much safer area. Initially, the retreat of the Carthaginian army was even orderly, maintaining the battle front. Scipio then ordered the retreating center of the Carthaginian army to be attacked by Iberian infantry units, whose role until then had been solely to distract the center of the Carthaginian army from coming to the aid of its collapsing wings. In turn, when the Roman legionaries fighting on the wings felt that the resistance of the Carthaginian wings had been broken, they attacked the enemy even more. Unable to stop the advancing Romans, the previously orderly retreat of the Carthaginian army turned into a panic retreat towards the camp on the hill.
Thus, the commander’s efforts to save the situation were of little avail. This is how Titus Livius describes the defeat of the Carthaginian army in his work: “And although Hasdrubal stopped those retreating and blocked their way, shouting over and over that there were hills behind and there they would find a safe shelter if they retreated with control, fear prevailed over the sense of honor, when everyone who was closest to the enemy fell dead, and everyone immediately gave up their backs and began to run away en masse. Then they first stopped with their banners on the slopes of the hills and began to draw the soldiers into ranks, while the Romans refrained from approaching the hill in front of them as a whole. However, when they saw that the enemy’s ranks were moving forward eagerly, they took up flight again and, crowding with fear, rushed to the camp”61.
The massacre of the Carthaginian army, which began to take place during its escape to the camp, was interrupted by a sudden storm. The rain streams softened the ground of the hill on which the Carthaginian army was located so much that it effectively prevented the Romans from pursuing the defeated Carthaginian forces. In this way, the surviving part of the Carthaginian army managed to take refuge in the camp. And although the actual battle ended with the defeat of the Carthaginian army, Hasdrubal still had significant forces at his disposal, as he managed to break away from the enemy before he completed the encirclement62. The actual battle did not end the struggles of both leaders.
Maneuvers and military actions of the parties after the battle proper
After taking refuge in the camp, the Carthaginians initially began to prepare to defend it. They began to bring stones from the nearby area to strengthen and raise the fortifications surrounding the camp in case the Romans decided to storm it the next day. However, if Hasdrubal Giskon counted on the fact that under the protection of the camp fortifications, the surviving part of the army would be able to rest, regroup and be ready to face the Romans again, he was severely disappointed. Desertions soon began among the Iberians allied with Carthage. In this situation, resisting the Romans based on a fortified camp was out of the question. Wanting to prevent the spread of further desertions and save as much of the army as possible, Hasdrubal decided to break away from the enemy. Under the cover of darkness, he led the remaining army out of the camp and began to retreat63.
The largest center of Carthaginian power was Gades (now Cadiz), and it was there that Hasdrubal Giskon and his remaining army most likely headed. The Battle of Ilipa took place on the right bank of the Betis River, so in order to reach Gades or other centers of Carthaginian power in southern Spain, Hasdrubal had to cross the Betis River to its left bank. If Hasdrubal had managed to cross the left bank of the Betis River, he would most likely have dispersed his remaining army among the fortified cities, just as in 207 BCE, and after Scipio’s departure he would have made the necessary additions and gathered it again64.
However, Scipio did not go to great lengths to formulate a plan to effectively oppose the numerically superior Carthaginian forces, only to let them escape when he gained an advantage over them, instead of completely annihilating them. The Carthaginian camp had already been surrounded by posts. So, as soon as the Carthaginian general slipped away with the rest of his troops after dark, the Romans noticed and chased him. After the Carthaginian army fleeing along the right bank of the Betis River, cavalry was immediately sent to maintain constant contact with it. However, the local guides of the Roman legions led them along a shorter route along the left bank of the river to the ford through which Hasdrubal intended to cross its lower course to the left, in order to cut off his route to the fortified fortresses of southern Spain65. However, Hasdrubal must have realized that the ford was occupied by the enemy waiting for his arrival, because he changed the direction of his escape. Deprived of the possibility of crossing the river and thus cut off from the centers of Carthaginian power, he moved southwest towards the Atlantic Ocean (see fig. 12)66.
He even managed to distance himself quite significantly from the Roman legions. Not for long though. The cavalry and light soldiers sent by Scipio in pursuit of Hasdrubal soon caught up with the Carthaginian army. Continuing to harass Hasdrubal’s forces with surprise attacks on his flanks and rear, they forced them to stop in order to resist. In this way, they effectively delayed the march of the fleeing Carthaginian forces so that the main Roman forces arrived. When the Roman legions caught up with the fleeing people, there was a rout of the Carthaginian army 67, which was described by Titus Livius in his work: “Now there was no longer a battle, but a slaughter as if among cattle, until the leader himself, the initiator of the flight, he escaped to the nearest hills with six thousand half-armed men. The rest were killed or taken prisoner”68. On one of these hills, these 6,000 The warriors saved from the pogrom fortified themselves with their leader and successfully resisted the Romans trying to gain their position. Surrounded by Scipio’s army, deprived of water and provisions, they found themselves in a hopeless situation. Soon, desertions began among the remnants of the Carthaginian army surrounded on the hill. Then Hasdrubal sent messengers to the coast, with orders to send him ships, because from the position he defended on the hill it was not far from the sea. After the ships arrived, he left the army defending on the hill at night, reached the coast and after getting on board the ship, sailed to Gades and from there to Carthage. When Scipio learned about the escape of the Carthaginian leader, he left his commander Marcus Junius Silanus with 10,000. infantry and 1 thousand cavalry with the task of maintaining the siege of the Carthaginian position on the hill, while he returned to Tarrakona himself69. Soon, Magon also managed to break out of the encirclement, reaching Gades on a ship sent back to him by Hasdrubal70. Massinissa, a Numidian prince and at the same time the commander of the Numidian cavalry supporting Carthage in the struggle against Rome, also reached Gades71. However, Massinissa reached Gades after conducting secret negotiations with Marcus Junius Silanus (left by Scipio in order to destroy the defending remnants of the Carthaginian army), as a result of which he decided to defect to Rome72. The rest of the warriors, who had been defending on the hill for some time, were abandoned by the commanders, some of them went to the opposite side, and some of them fled, scattering to the surrounding towns and settlements. 75,000 collected by Hasdrubal Giskon. the Carthaginian army ceased to exist73. This is how he commented on the end of the military operations at Ilipa in his work entitled From the founding of the City Roman historian Titus Livus: “And there was no longer any team that had any importance either in number of men or in strength”74. The Battle of Ilipa is over.
The effects of the Battle of Ilipa
The effects of Scipio’s victory in the Battle of Ilipa should be assessed in two aspects, i.e. achieving the goal of the military task, which was to win the war with Carthage in the area of its rule in Spain (today defined as achieving the goal of the war at the operational level) and achieving the long-term goal, which was was to win the entire war with Carthage (today defined as achieving the goal of the war at the strategic level).
In terms of Rome achieving the war goal at the operational level, the most important result of the destruction of almost all Carthaginian forces in the Battle of Ilipa was the irreversible end of Carthaginian rule in Spain (see Fig. 13). After the lost battle, both Carthaginian commanders took refuge in the city of Gades, which had been the headquarters of the Carthaginian rule in Spain since Scipio’s conquest of New Carthage in 209 BCE. Soon Hasdrubal Giscon sailed to Carthage. Magon, who remained in Gades, tried to rally the surrounding Iberian tribes to fight the Romans. He managed to gather a force of only about 4,000. warriors, which, however, were quickly defeated by the Roman unit left in the south of Spain under the command of Lucius Marcius (the same one who gathered the remnants of the Roman forces after their pogrom in 211 BCE ended with the death of the Scipio brothers). The Iberian tribes that had previously been subordinate to Carthage were simply no longer interested in supporting her in the fight against Rome, because they considered her cause lost. Therefore, although most of the Carthaginian rule in Spain remained unconquered by the Romans, after Ilipus, Carthage was no longer able to effectively oppose Rome’s takeover (through diplomatic actions or force) of influence in the area that had previously been its dominion (see figure 13)75. The defeat at Ilipa made Carthage’s withdrawal from Spain simply inevitable. This was realized by both Magon, who was planning to leave Gades and sail to Africa, and the authorities in Carthage themselves. Before Magon could sail from Spain to Africa, the authorities in Carthage ordered him to leave Spain with the fleet in Gades and sail to northern Italy in order to recruit among the Gallic and Ligurian tribes. With the army thus recruited, he was then to move towards the south of Italy to try to connect with Hannibal76. Before he began to fulfill the order of the authorities in Carthage, Magon made one last attempt to create a new front in Spain. Together with his fleet, he sailed along the coast and unexpectedly attacked New Carthage, counting – as Livy claims – “that the city was not held by a strong enough crew and that a number of inhabitants would also take action in the hope of changing the situation”77 However, the inhabitants of New Carthage did not help him, and the attack on the city itself failed. Repulsed with losses from the walls of New Carthage, he returned to Gades. However, he found the gates of Gades closed. The city did not give him shelter within its walls. The fact that the Carthaginian leader and youngest brother of Hannibal – co-founder of the Carthaginian dominium in Spain – was not allowed to enter the city whose population – which is worth emphasizing – was of Phoenician origin, becomes a symbol of the end of Carthaginian rule in Spain. Magon had no choice but to sail from Spain with his remaining army and spend the winter in the Balearic Islands. The next year – 205 BCE – he would land in northern Italy, opening a second front. Shortly after Magon’s departure, the old Phoenician colony of Gades surrenders without a fight to the Romans. Thus, the last trace of Carthaginian presence in Spain was removed78.
When it comes to the aspect of achieving the goal of the war at the strategic level (i.e. winning the war with Carthage), the effect of Scipio’s victory at Ilipa was to change the current balance of forces in favor of Rome and thus tip the scales of victory in the entire war to its side. Spain was crucial to ensuring Carthage’s ability to wage war against Rome due to its wealth, human resources and strategic location enabling operations against Sardinia or Corsica, but above all against Italy itself. Since Scipio, by destroying almost all of the Carthaginian forces at Ilipa, ended Carthaginian rule in Spain, Spain, with its silver mines, recruitment base and strategic location, ceased to be Carthage’s financial and military support, which seriously affected its ability to continue waging the war 79. Shortly after losing the battle, Magon evacuated the remnants of the Carthaginian forces from Spain and landed with them in northern Italy, where he augmented them with troops of Gallic and Ligurian warriors. Even though Carthage provided Magon with reinforcements and finances by sea, they were no longer sufficient for Magon to break through to Hannibal through the Roman armies blocking him. Although he managed to create a second front in northern Italy, it was soon blocked there by the Romans, requiring further support. Carthage, deprived of Spain’s financial and military potential and its strategic location, was not only unable to support him any longer but, as it soon turned out, began to require support itself and in 203 BCE recalled Magon to Africa80. The defeat at Ilipa, with its direct effect of ending Carthaginian rule in Spain, caused such a significant change in the balance of power in the war that Carthage made another invasion of Italy impossible. The turning of the scales of victory towards Rome was understood by the Numidian prince Massinissa, commanding the Carthaginian cavalry at Ilipa, who secretly switched to the Roman side after the end of the battle. The transfer of Masinissa to the Roman side further reduced – as the near future was to show – Carthage’s military potential. Therefore, although for some time after Ilipus Hannibal continued to fight in the south, and his brother Magon in the north of Italy, and although the war lasted another four years, after Ilipus it was only a matter of time before Carthage lost the entire war81 .
Scipio’s “Reverse Cannae” versus Hannibal’s “Cannae
The Battle of Ilipa from 206 BCE is considered Scipio’s most spectacular victory in terms of maneuvers in his entire career, and the maneuver he used to flank the enemy on both sides with the intention of surrounding him and completely destroying him is also called “reverse Cannae”. It is easy to notice that the term “inverted Cannae”, on the one hand, refers to the double-sided flanking maneuver used by Hannibal in the Battle of Cannae (called the “Cannaean maneuver”), but on the other hand, by using the word “inverted”, it is also contrasted with this maneuver. This triggers the desire to compare these battles, and thus the tactical skills of both victorious commanders, which seems to be quite a risky undertaking82. Despite this, it is difficult to resist trying to point out the similarities and differences between these battles and compare their effects at the tactical and strategic level.
Both leaders had to fight a battle against an opponent who significantly outnumbered them, and this is certainly a similarity between both battles. However, this is where the similarities between them end. The manner in which both battles were fought and the conditions in which the two commanders had to fight them were completely different.
Taking into account the number and quality of individual types of troops that both commanders had at their disposal and relating it to the number and quality of individual types of troops of their opponents, a significant difference can be noticed. At Cannae, Hannibal had much less infantry than his opponent, but much more cavalry, which was of better quality than the Roman cavalry. However, at Ilipa, Scipio had both fewer infantry than his opponent and less cavalry, which was of lower quality than the Carthaginian cavalry, which had in its ranks the highly trained Numidian cavalry under the command of Prince Masinissa83. Moreover, at Ilipa, Scipio also had war elephants at his disposal against the Carthaginian army. The difference in the number and quality of individual types of troops possessed by both commanders and by their opponents therefore determined the different manner in which each of them carried out the double flanking maneuver of their opponent.
Hannibal, having less infantry at Cannae than his opponent, but more cavalry of better quality, chose a defensive stance84. Therefore, he decided that the center of his army, consisting of Iberian and Gallic infantry, would take the momentum of the more numerous Roman center attacking it and, gradually giving way to the rear, he would slow it down, trying to withstand the Roman pressure until the more numerous and better trained Carthaginian cavalry beat the Roman cavalry on the wings. By adopting a defensive stance, Hannibal lured the Roman army towards the increasingly backward center of the Carthaginian army, which it pressed against with the intention of breaking it and moving to its rear. Luring the Roman army towards the increasingly backward Carthaginian center had the effect of not engaging the heavy African infantry deployed in equal numbers on both flanks. This allowed Hannibal to turn inwards towards the flanks of the Roman army on both wings, with the African infantry not engaged in the fight, thus leading to its double flanking. At this time, the Carthaginian cavalry defeated the Roman cavalry on both wings, and when it did so, part of this cavalry (i.e. the less numerous Numidian cavalry) was directed to pursue the fleeing remnants of the Roman cavalry, and some (i.e. the more numerous Iberian and Gallic cavalry) attacked the rear of the Roman army, which was already outflanked at that time, encircling it85. The consequence of closing the encirclement by the Carthaginian cavalry was the massacre of almost the entire Roman army (see Fig. 14). Hannibal’s tactics were therefore dependent on Roman offensiveness. If the Romans had not attacked the Carthaginian army with such force, trying to break its center, but had extended the battle line, they would not have fallen into the trap, and then Hannibal would most likely not have been able to win the battle86.
Having less infantry at Ilipa than his opponent, as well as less cavalry, which was of lower quality than the Carthaginian cavalry, Scipio, unlike Hannibal, chose an offensive stance87. Therefore, he decided not to wait for the attack of the Carthaginian army with elephants and more numerous and better quality cavalry, the attack of which would inevitably cause confusion and losses in his ranks, but he attacked the enemy himself, using: a surprise attack on the sleeping enemy camp, then exhausting the hungry and sleep-deprived enemies with a long waiting for the main battle and finally a series of efficiently conducted maneuvers with the wings of one’s own army in order to flank the enemy. Taking an offensive stance, Scipio moved with all his forces towards the numerically superior Carthaginian army. With the first maneuver, he moved the wings of the marching army, manned by select Roman and Italian infantry, as well as velites and cavalry, to the sides until they reached the edge of both wings of the Carthaginian army, while maintaining the slow march of his center, which was occupied by the inferior allied forces with him the Iberian infantry, towards the stationary center of the enemy consisting of selected Carthaginian and African infantry. With the second maneuver, he transformed the lines of both wings into columns, which thus gained mobility and began to move towards the enemy faster than a long battle front. Still marching the entire army towards the enemy, but with the wings moving at a faster pace than its center, he formed a concave battle line. In a third maneuver, Scipio reshaped the wings of his army from columns into battle lines so that the Roman and Italian infantry advanced towards the front, and the velites and cavalry positioned on the outside of these columns advanced towards the flanks of the Carthaginian army manned on both wings by Iberian infantry. Binding both Carthaginian wings from the front by fighting the Roman and Italian infantry allowed the velites and cavalry to reach the flanks of the Carthaginian army, leading to its double flanking and even partial encirclement. At this time, the African and Carthaginian infantry stood uselessly in the center, unable to come to the aid of the collapsing wings, because they were threatened by the attack of the Roman center, which was still slowly moving towards it, manned by the Iberian infantry allied with Scipio. However, not having a quantitative advantage over his opponent in cavalry (which Hannibal had at Cannae), Scipio was unable to attack the flanked Carthaginian army from behind along its entire length to close the encirclement. The consequence of this was that the enemy escaped from the tightening flank and took refuge in the camp (see Fig. 15)88. Scipio’s tactics depended on Carthaginian passivity. If the Carthaginians had attacked the Roman army during the first, and especially after the commencement or during the second, maneuver, they could have led to the defeat, or at least to the disorganization of the Roman wings, and Scipio would most likely not have been able to win the battle89 .
So why, despite such fundamental differences in how both battles took place, is the Battle of Ilipa called “reverse Cannae”? Calling Ilipa this name is intended to indicate that Scipio’s double flanking maneuver of a much larger enemy is worthy only of Hannibal himself and his Cannaean maneuver. At Ilipa, Scipio’s tactical genius was to equal that of Hannibal himself at Cannae, with the difference that Scipio double-flanked the enemy with an offensive maneuver, i.e. the opposite (hence the “inverted Cannae”) to that of Hannibal, whose Cannaean maneuver was essentially defensive. 90. If so, it is worth comparing both battles from the point of view of their effects at the tactical and strategic level.
As for the effects of both battles at the tactical level, it is worth noting that at Cannae, despite the significant numerical superiority of the opponent, a multinational army consisting of mercenary and allied contingents – which included many separate national groups, with different laws, customs, languages, fighting styles and which could easily become impossible to coordinate – Hannibal managed to first double flank, then surround and virtually annihilate the largest Roman army fielded in the entire Second Punic War. According to Polybius, Roman losses were huge and amounted to approximately 70,000. killed and 10 thousand prisoners, and only about 3,000 managed to escape, with Hannibal’s losses amounting to only 5,700. killed (Polib. 3.117.6). In turn, according to Livy, Roman losses amounted to over 48,000. dead and about 19 thousand prisoners, and approximately 14.5 thousand managed to escape, with Hannibal’s losses amounting to approximately 8,000. killed (Liv. 22.52.6). In turn, at Ilipa, despite the enemy outnumbering him in every type of army, with an army whose loyalty he could only be sure of in relation to the Roman and Italian infantry, i.e. to about half of its personnel – carrying out a series of complex maneuvers in front of the battle line that could at any time moment, the enemy fell on him – Scipio managed to double flank the Carthaginian army, and then relatively quickly break its extreme formations and inflict serious losses. However, Scipio did not manage to surround and annihilate the Carthaginian army, because Hasdrubal Giscon, despite all the mistakes he had made, saw that this was about to happen and withdrew the army in time, preventing the trap from closing. Ilipa, therefore, remained largely unfinished. However, this does not diminish Scipio’s achievement, because the Carthaginian army taking shelter in the camp neither saved it nor changed the fate of the entire battle. The disintegration and destruction of the Carthaginian army occurred only a little later, during the Roman pursuit. This was certainly influenced by the lost battle proper, during which the Carthaginian warriors, and especially the Iberian allies of Carthage, became convinced of the combat capabilities of the Roman legions and the abilities of the leader at their head. No longer believing in the possibility of victory, they did not put up any organized resistance after being caught by the Roman legions, which ended in another pogrom 91. It can be assumed that since both Carthaginian wings were defeated relatively quickly during the actual battle, and later only those who fled were massacred, the difference in losses at Ilipa, including the pursuit, could have been even greater than at Cannae. The Carthaginians at Ilipa may have lost about as many men as the Romans at Cannae, while Scipio probably lost much less than Hannibal 92. However, it should be noted that these are only assumptions, as the exact losses of both sides at Ilipa were not described in the sources. From the point of view of effects at the tactical level, it should be concluded that Ilipa and Kannami can be put on an equal footing.
As for the effects of both battles at the strategic level, suffice it to say that Hannibal, despite inflicting a devastating defeat on Rome at Cannae, only to a limited extent achieved his intended strategic goal, which was to lead to the collapse of the Italian federation and thus force Rome to enter into peace negotiations aimed at ending the war on terms favorable to Carthage. It is true that after Cannae, some of the Italians in southern Italy, including Capua – the largest city after Rome – left the Italian federation, but most of the Italians remained loyal to Rome until the end of the conflict. Moreover, in the case of the Latin colonies, during the 15 years of fighting and Hannibal’s stay in this area, not one of them joined the Carthaginian leader93. However, after the victory over Carthage at Ilipa, Scipio caused the Iberian tribes that had supported it to abandon the Carthaginian cause and thus irrevocably ended Carthaginian rule in Spain, tipping the scales of victory in the entire war to Rome’s side94. Therefore, when comparing both battles from the point of view of their effects at the strategic level, it should be concluded that Scipio’s “reverse Cannae” will rank higher than Hannibal’s Cannae.
Regardless of how the effects of both battles are assessed, planning and then precisely carrying out complex maneuvers in time and space with such a huge number of foot and horsemen in the face of an opponent almost twice as numerous, and inflicting a devastating defeat on this opponent, allows Scipio and Hannibal to be considered the most outstanding ancient commanders. and both battles equally considered the most excellent achievements in military history.
Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus
After driving the Carthaginians out of Spain, Scipio subjugated most of the tribes inhabiting its eastern and southern parts and took revenge on those tribes that had led to the death of his father and uncle. The Romans devastated their lands, burned their dwellings, killed their leaders and massacred their people95. Shortly after these events, Scipio, gloriously victorious, returned to Rome, where in 205 BCE he was elected consul. He put forward a bold proposal in the Senate to attack Carthage on its own territory in Africa. He rightly argued that only attacking Carthage on its own territory could persuade Hannibal to leave Italy to defend his home country. The Senate accepted Scipio’s proposal and entrusted him with preparing and carrying out the invasion of Africa. The invasion of Carthage was to come from Sicily96.
In the late spring of 204 BCE, a fleet of 440 ships sailed from Sicily and set course for the coast of Africa. On board of one of the ships of this armada there was a certain young Roman commander… This is how the Roman invasion of Carthage began, and the Roman commander commanding this invasion, after its completion, went down in history under the name of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus98.
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