Chapters
The period from the Battle of Cannae to the evacuation of Hannibal from the Apennine Peninsula is a time of marches and countermarches of Roman and Punic armies, often along the same roads of southern Italy. Both the armies of the Republic and Carthage fought in these areas for the control of key cities such as Nola, Capua, Taranto and Benevento. Historical sources providing information about these events are primarily the message of Livy and a few fragments from Polybius. Livy’s testimony has been repeatedly criticized by researchers and contains exaggerated descriptions of skirmishes with elements of propaganda serving the glory of Roman aristocratic families.
Military operations in Italy. The ratio of forces of both sides
Cities in southern Italy, as in other areas, were torn apart by fights between factions. In the face of the “world war” between Carthage and Rome, it became necessary for them to take sides, Factions or factions in urban centers were either for Carthage or for Rome. Many cities of Campania remained faithful to Rome, the Latin communities showed particular loyalty. Even though Hannibal conquered most of southern Italy, many of Rome’s allies remained loyal to the Republic. The strong relationship of the Republic with its allies proved to be durable even in the difficult moments of this war for the Romans. The territories loyal to them were either guarded by Roman garrisons or by the local ruling elites, who highly valued the alliance with the country on the Tiber. In order to prevent the allies from switching to the side of the enemy, the Romans maintained strong troops in Etruria for most of the war and reacted quickly to rumors of a possible rebellion in Arretium.
The situation of Carthage’s Italian allies was more complicated. They had no common identity and no sense of common purpose. Each city faithful to Hannibal had separate interests and required him to protect him from the repressions of the Roman army. In several cases, the Campanians and Samnites complained about the lack of sufficient help from the Carthaginians in this regard. The most important city that supported Hannibal after the Battle of Cannae was Capua. The Carthaginians allowed the city to maintain its autonomy and promised not to recruit its inhabitants into their army or perform other activities against their will. The city was to accept 300 Roman prisoners, who were later to be exchanged for Campanian cavalrymen serving in the ranks of the Republic in Sicily. However, the latter refused to return to their home city and received rewards for this from the Romans. Most of the cities that went over to Hannibal’s side did so only when the Carthaginian army approached their walls. Barcid tried to force some of the centers into submission. This was the case at the end of 216 BCE, when the Carthaginians twice tried to intimidate the inhabitants of Naples. Despite the crushing defeat suffered by the Neapolitan cavalry outside the city walls, its authorities did not allow any rival faction to arise in the city, opting for handing over the city to the Punics. Having achieved nothing, Hannibal dragged himself to Nuceria, trying to force this centre into submission by starvation. His attempt to conquer Nola ended without success. After the fall of Capua, Hannibal proceeded to besiege Kasilinum at the end of 216 BCE. In the spring of 215 BCE, the besiegers were supported by a large part of his army. The city was located on the Volturnus River and had roads that ran along Via Appia and Via Latina. The city was fiercely defended by 500 Latin soldiers from Preneste under the command of Marcus Anicius and 460 Perusians supported by a number of stragglers from the Roman field armies. When the defenders ran out of food supplies, it was decided to bring it in the form of roots and grass from outside the walls. The Roman army of Gracchus, operating nearby, delivered corn in jars to the city at night. However, when Hannibal discovered these supplies, he placed stronger guards on the river and thus deprived Anicius of outside help. Seeing their hopeless situation, the defenders capitulated. After paying the ransom, the crew was released. Hannibal gave the city to the Campanians and reinforced their new garrison in the city with his 700 warriors to defend Kassilinum from the Roman threat. In the period after 216 BCE, Barcid had to protect allied communities from Roman reprisals. The problem was that even the accession of a centre in Italy to an alliance with him did not significantly increase the strength of his troops. At various times, Carthaginian armies in Italy consisted mainly of Italians supported by mercenaries from Hannibal’s main army and commanded by Carthaginian officers. At the Battle of the Calor River in 214 BCE, the Romans defeated Hanno’s Punic army with 17,000 Brutian and Lucanian infantry supported by 1,200 Numidian and Mauritian cavalry. The same Carthaginian army suffered a crushing defeat at Beneventum in 212 BCE, where the Romans surprised Hanno’s men while foraging. During this battle, the Roman allies from Preneste, who was the first to break into the Punic camp, distinguished themselves. These clashes prove the military weakness of the Italian allies supporting Hannibal’s main army. Hence, the Romans were more afraid of fighting with Barcid itself than with the undemanding armies of the Italians. In addition, most of the latter did not have the numerous cavalry that contributed so much to Hannibal’s victories. The Italian communities supporting Barcid were reluctant to support him with larger groups outside their native lands. Hannibal’s difficult situation on the peninsula was aggravated by the losses of his main army, resulting from clashes with the enemy and diseases, and the need to support part of the allied forces. Only in 214 BCE, it received significant support from the outside, when the Punic fleet blew up transport with troops, supplies and war elephants in Locra.
Republic forces were in a completely different situation. Rome’s demographic potential gave it an advantage over any enemy. By the end of the war, a record number of legions were called up to arms. In the spring of 215 BCE, there were probably 14 legions in service, in 214 – there were already 18. Their number steadily increased, giving the Romans in the years 212-211 BCE 25 legiones (which theoretically equalled a number of at least 100,000 infantry and 7,500 cavalry supported by an equal number of allies as usual). Most of these troops were stationed in Italy. Within ten years after the battle of Cannae, 4-7 consular armies were stationed in Italy, supported by several 1-legion units and smaller groups and garrisons. The chain of command showed greater than usual longevity in the service of senior commanders. Claudius Marcellus served in the army continuously from 216 to 208 BCE. This phenomenon was conducive to the acquisition of more experience by the commanders and better bonding with their subordinates. Cooperation between the commanders of individual armies, who supported each other, functioned well. Until 211 BCE, the Romans focused on Campania. In 215 BCE, the armies of Fabius and Gracchus moved into its territory. Gracchus’ troops liberated Kyme from the enemy’s hands, after which the armies of both consuls moved against the enemy outposts defending access to Capua. Marcellus in 214 BCE protected Fabius when he captured Kasilinum. In this war, urban centres were tried to be conquered by treason. One of the nobles from the city of Arpi offered Fabius to hand over the city in exchange for a reward. informing him of the weaknesses of the defence. Fabius started a supposed siege but secretly prepared 600 men for a night attack. There was a storm at night, which helped the Romans because visibility was poor and the guards came down from the walls. Using ladders, the legionaries broke into the weak point of the walls, entered the city and seized the entrances at the gates. Thanks to this, the rest of the army entered Arpia before dawn. The resistance of the Punic garrison and the inhabitants in the streets of the city, which finally capitulated, lasted only for a while. The Punics were allowed to join Hannibal’s main army, and about 1,000 Spaniards entered Roman service. This was the second serious case of desertion from the army of Barcid – in the previo